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RESPONDING TO THE SUPREME
COURT'S EFFORT TO END THE
CONVERSATION ABOUT RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTIONS AND WELCOMING
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN INTO THE
CONVERSATION
RODNEY K. SMITH*
I. INTRODUCTION
In her paper, Judging Religion, Professor Sullivan, "propose[s] that
religious studies can help lawyers and judges to acknowledge the
religiousness of Americans without establishing it."1 I am on record as
supporting the need to draw on the insights of religious studies and
theology in developing a viable constitutional definition and fair process
that will help unify free exercise and establishment concepts of the First
Amendment,2 although I have focused on "conscience" and not
"religion" as the operative term in need of definition.3 Through the use
of an actual case, Professor Sullivan seeks to demonstrate that scholars
in religious studies can be effective "conversation" partners4 in judicial
decision-making. I agree that religious studies can offer assistance in
the judicial decision-making process, although I have previously argued
that theology, religious studies, and other disciplines may offer even
more assistance initially as conversation partners in the legislative
* Donaghey Dean and Professor of Law, University of Arkansas-Little Rock School of
Law. J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University; LL.M., S.J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of
Kathy L. Hall and the secretarial support of Linda Ahlen.
1. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Judging Religion, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 441 (1998).
2. See, Rodney K. Smith, Converting the Religious Equality Amendment into a Statute
with a Little Conscience, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 675-86 (1996).
3. Throughout the remainder of the paper, I will largely use the term "religion," and not
the broader term "conscience," in an effort to remain consistent with the terminology used
by Professor Sullivan. When I use the term "religion," however, the term "conscience" could
be substituted for it.
4. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 458-59.
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context.5
Professor Sullivan's article is a solid effort to demonstrate some of
the ways in which religious studies can inform the judicial decision-
making process. On many occasions, however, as I reflected on the
content of the paper, I was left desiring elaboration of certain points
made by Professor Sullivan. For example, in acknowledging the
challenge of defining religion,6 she asserts that, "The difficulties of
tightly defining religion ... are familiar to religion scholars."' After
further admitting that, "[t]he amorphous quality of... religious lives...
is not easily susceptible to categorical definition,"8 she adds that, "What
is needed is a theory of religion that can take account of these
difficulties and provide a language about religion that will serve lawyers
and judges."9  For Professor Sullivan, this helpful language about
religion can only be revealed by refusing "to pin cultural forms like
religion into brittle crystalline structures . . ."'0 and she "view[s] the
appropriate relationship of knowledge to power in [religion] case[s] as
being one of dialogue and process."" Sadly, however, after sharing
these insights, Professor Sullivan provides little additional guidance as
to the nature of this "dialogue and process . . . ." At this broad
theoretical level, the reader is left to wonder how religious studies will
aid in developing a viable dialogue and fair process.
At the more practical level, Professor Sullivan again seems to leave
the reader in midair. She reveals that the compulsion and motivation
tests, that have alternatively been relied upon by lower courts in
determining what constitutes a protected act under the substantial
burden analysis mandated by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
5. I have argued that Congress should have the first "bite" at the [definitional] apple:
Congress [s]hould conduct hearings to aid in formulating a viable definition [of
conscience/religion]. In conducting those hearings, Congress can draw on a wealth of
expertise-psychological, theological, legal, and philosophical-in seeking to arrive at an
eclectic and viable definition of 'conscience.' The courts can thereafter 'liquidate ... through
adjudication' the definition supplied by Congress." Smith, supra note 2, at 685.
6. Jurists and legal scholars have struggled to articulate a viable definition of "religion"
for First Amendment purposes, and have made little progress in their efforts. See id at 675-
86.
7. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 453.
8. Id. at 454.
9. Id.
10. Id. In this regard, Professor Sullivan relies upon the work of Larry Rosen who
argues against rigid structures. According to Professor Sullivan, Professor Rosen chooses
rather to acknowledge "cultural indeterminacy" and "focus ... on the culture of dealing with
that indeterminacy." Id.
11. Id. at 455.
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(RFRA)," both "have a Protestant bias."" Unfortunately, Professor
Sullivan does not explain why this is the case. She also states that
"theological questions are begged throughout the testimony and
opinions in Sasnet v. Sullivan 4 [the case she discusses]," but she fails to
amplify this interesting point. Thus, while I find Professor Sullivan's
thesis to be congenial, my major criticism is that she does not provide
the kind of specific support for her conclusions that is demanded in
deciding legal cases.
As one who largely agrees with Professor Sullivan, I would have
benefited from more elaboration of her thesis. Nevertheless, I am
convinced that she offers insights, drawn from her religious studies
background, that support the proposition that religious studies can
provide assistance in legal efforts to determine what constitutes a
substantial burden for purposes of RFRA and in defining religion. Her
caveat to the effect that jurists unwittingly may apply tests (e.g., the
underlying motivation and compulsion tests in RFRA cases) in a
manner that prefers a particular religion or group of religions should
also cause courts and lawmakers to proceed with caution in applying or
giving definition to those terms or other terms essential to analysis in
the law and religion area.
In addition to applauding Professor Sullivan's suggestion that the
insights from religious studies can be utilized more effectively in legal
decision-making, I am pleased that she recognizes the need for a more
interdisciplinary dialogue or conversation 5 regarding definitional and
other legal issues in the church-state context. She also recognizes that,
if religion is defined too subjectively, everyone could "make up his own
religion."'6 Consequently, Professor Sullivan suggests that focusing on
"dialogue and process," as opposed to trying to develop a structure and
crystalline definition, can aid courts in dealing with practical legal issues
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 bb et seq. (1993). In City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157
(1997), the Supreme Court held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is
unconstitutional. See infra notes 22-24, 34 and accompanying text, for a more detailed
analysis of the Court's decision in Flores.
13. Professor Sullivan argues that, "While both tests, as presented in [the case she
discusses], have a Protestant bias, the objective [compulsion] test because of its focus on
belief and the subjective [motivation] test because of its focus on the individual, neither test
is surprising ..... Sullivan, supra note 1, at 448-49.
14. lL See generally Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
15. I prefer the term "dialogue" to "conversation," the term employed by Professor
Sullivan. "Dialogue" is somewhat more formal than "conversation," and reflects the
formality of the legal decision making process, but it is also generally interchangeable. In
this comment, I will hereafter use the term "dialogue" rather than "conversation."
16. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 453.
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in the law and religion area. Again, I largely agreed with this general
observation, when I noted that:
[James Madison's] call for a series of particular discussions and
adjudications implies a role for all branches of the government.
The legislative and executive branches should be involved in the
discussion of what [conscience or religion] means, drawing on
the expertise of theologians, philosophers, psychologists,
sociologists, and lawyers. Formulating . . . a meaningful
definition . . . requires participation in an interbranch [and
interdisciplinary] dialogue.
I also heartily share Professor Sullivan's observation that a fair
process-a process that listens and responds with sensitivity and
empathy 8 to the subjective conversation of the party seeking protection
for her "religion"-is critical in itself and as a means of "liquidating"19 a
meaningful legal language over time. However, that process must be
further explicated.
In the remainder of this paper, I offer some comments, provisional
as they may be, to provide more of the detail I wish that Professor
Sullivan would have included, as to a number of matters raised in her
paper. Of course, in doing so, my observations are necessarily general
and, therefore, fall prey to the very criticism of lack of elaboration that I
offer in response to Professor Sullivan's initial suggestions. I trust,
nevertheless, that my comments add a bit to the interesting dialogue
initiated by Professor Sullivan. In that spirit, the remainder of this
comment will be divided into the following parts: Part II will discuss
the Supreme Court's recent decision in the Flores case, which limited
religious liberty by holding that RFRA is unconstitutional;2° Part III will
17. Smith, supra note 2, at 682.
18. Professor Sullivan does not use the term "empathy," but her paper certainly seems
to imply that level of sensitivity to the arguments offered by prisoners and others who are
asserting a religious reason for certain action. A meaningful "language about religion" can
only be derived from an empathetic dialogue, in which the party asserting a religious right is
able to articulate her position fully and before a tribunal committed to trying to understand
that position.
19. "Liquidating" is borrowed from James Madison's statement that: "All new laws,
though penned with the greatest skill and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation,
are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and
ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications." THE FEDERALIST NO.
37, at 229 (J. Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis added).
20. Much of Professor Sullivan's paper was based on Sasnet v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp.
1429 (W.D. Wis. 1995), a lower court case, which was decided under RFRA. Her points,
regarding the role of religious studies, remain somewhat relevant despite the Supreme
Court's holding in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), but the Supreme Court
certainly has restricted the instances in which questions of the sort discussed in Professor
[Vol. 81:487
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examine some meritorious characteristics of "religion" that deserve
Constitutional protection; Part IV will next discuss the substantial
burden test and the need for an empathetic process; Part V will briefly
examine the issue of the interaction between religious liberty and
cultural preservation, which Professor Sullivan characterizes as the
conflict between "cultural independence [and] the right of religious
freedom; 2' and, some concluding comments will be made Part V.
II. THE AFTERMATH OF CITY OF BOERNE V. FLORES: No END TO THE
CONVERSATION
In writing for the Court in Mores, Justice Kennedy held RFRA to be
unconstitutional and opined that, "Broad as the power of Congress is
under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA
contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers
and the federal[-state] balance."" This blow for religious liberty claims
against laws of general applicability may not be fatal. However, indeed,
Justice Kennedy's opinion suggests two major ways in which the
adverse implications of the decision for religious liberty can be
mitigated.
First, Justice Kennedy acknowledges that:
While the line between measures [like RFRA] that remedy or
prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a
substantive change in governing law is not easy to discern, and
Sullivan's paper will have to be resolved.
21. Professor Sullivan raises, but does not respond in any depth to the following
quandary:
In Chiapas, in Southern Mexico, debate is had in modern Mayan communities
seeking to preserve their traditions as to whether they are better served by
demanding the right to cultural independence or the right to religious freedom.
Understanding themselves as dedicated to preserving a culture allows Mayans
certain rights as a community over against dissenting individuals which the language
of religious freedom does not permit, because religious freedom in Mexico is a right
that belongs to an individual. Indian communities, like other smaller religious
communities, like Hasidic communities, wish to be able to discipline their members
for heterodoxy. They cannot do that if a member can assert an individual right to
religious liberty.
Sullivan, supra note 1, at 458-59. This seeming conflict between cultural preservation and
religious freedom is of significance in many places throughout the world. In Russia, for
example, the Parliament recently passed a law that would limit religious freedom for many
minority religionists on the ground that those minority religions undercut tradition Russian
culture, which is largely based in Russian Orthodoxy. See, e.g., Peggy Lowe, Religion Law
Worries Catholic Priests in Russia, DENVER POST, Oct. 11, 1997, at B6, and infra, notes 62-
63, and accompanying text.
22. 117S. Ct. 2157,2172(1997).
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Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the
distinction exists and must be observed. There must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.
Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive
in operation and effect.2
Later in the opinion, he notes that:
The substantial costs RFRA exacts, both in practical terms of
imposing a heavy litigation burden on the States and in terms of
curtailing their traditional general regulatory power, far exceed
any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the
Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith. Simply put,
RFRA is not designed to identify and counteract state laws
likely to be unconstitutional because of their treatment of
religion.4
These comments leave open possibilities for revitalizing RFRA at
the Congressional level. Congress might even build a record indicating
that laws of general application often harm religions in significant ways.
It might also develop a record that demonstrates that legislative bodies
may be insensitive, if not hostile, to requests for exemption on religious
grounds by those politically uninfluential religious groups.2' In building
such a record, Congress could call on testimony from religious studies
scholars, who can establish, as Professor Sullivan seems to suggest, that
even facially general laws may have a religious bias. That bias may be
inherent in the law itself, as is certainly true of Sunday closing laws,
which favor majority religionists but disfavor some minority
23. Id. at 2164 (emphasis added).
24. d. at 2171.
25. In this sense, legislative bodies that refuse to grant an exemption for minority
religions often omit to act out of hostility or mere indifference to the politically uninfluential
religious group. It is unlikely, however, that the same legislative body would omit to act, by
granting an exemption, in the case of a larger, influential religious group. I acknowledge,
however, that this admission of institutional insensitivity may be difficult to draw out of
Congress, because it accentuates a weakness in the legislative process. Such an act of
institutional humility, however, might help placate the Court's sense that Congressional
adoption of RFRA constituted an arrogant usurpation by Congress of the Court's authority.
That humility might, as well, help eliminate the possibility of an institutional crisis in
constitutional governance that may result if the Court and Congress continue their "in your
face" dialogue that has characterized their interaction over the issue of religious liberty in
the past few years (i.e., Congress disagrees with the Court's decision in the Smith case and
responds by telling the Court the test that it must use to decide cases in the area and the
Court responds by emphatically denying Congress authority in the area). As escalation of
this "in your face" dialogue may contribute to public cynicism about each Branch and
threaten the legitimacy of our constitutional form of government.
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religionists,' or it may be evident in a more subtle sense. Laws of
general applicability appear on their face to be religiously neutral.
However, that may not be the case. A general law that had the effect of
harming a politically influential religious group is unlikely to be
adopted in the first instance. Politically influential religious groups can
oppose the law itself or simply seek an exemption from it.2 Thus, it is
unlikely that a law of general applicability that would harm a politically
influential or major religious group would ever be adopted. Minority
and less influential religious groups, however, do not have similar access
to legislative power and are, therefore, subject to being regulated by
laws of general application in ways that majority or influential religious
groups are not. Uninfluential minority religionists, therefore, do not
have the power to prevent a general law that adversely impacts them
from being passed nor do they have the power necessary to obtain an
exemption to it.'
To document this type of religious inequity or discrimination,
Congress could develop a detailed record with examples and testimony
from a variety of experts indicating the implicit discriminatory nature of
the lawmaking process itself. The preference for major or influential
religious groups in the making of laws of general applicability, if
meticulously documented, should provide a basis for using the
enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment to rectify the harms
done to minority religions through that process. 29 Congress could also
assert that it was enforcing the establishment provision of the First
Amendment, which requires that laws preferring one religion or a
group of religions be declared constitutionally impermissible. In this
regard, Congress would demonstrate that the lawmaking process
26. Blue laws or Sunday closing laws have been found to be constitutionally permissible,
but they clearly have some inherent bias against sabbatarians, Muslims, and other religious
groups that recognize a holy day other than Sunday. Similarly, it has been forcefully argued
that the polygamy laws passed by Congress in the Nineteenth Century were actually hostile
even though they appeared to be facially neutral. See discussion regarding Congressional
antipathy to the "Mormons" as a major factor in the drafting of facially neutral laws against
polygamy discussed in Edwin B. Firmage & Richard Collin Mangrius, ZION IN THE COURTS:
A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 1830-1896
(1988).
27. Exemptions of this sort are constitutional in light of the Supreme Court's
controversial decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 87 (1990).
28. This inability to obtain an exemption may itself evidence a measure of
discriminatory intent or indifference on the part of the legislature. It is unlikely that a larger
religious group would similarly be denied such an exemption.
29. The magnitude of harms that have been or might be the product of the lawmaking
process associated with laws of general applicability should be detailed in the record, as well.
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associated with laws of general applicability is itself suspect on
establishment grounds. If Congress were able to achieve this
evidentiary objective, through extensive hearings, the dicta from Justice
Kennedy's opinion seems to imply that the Court would permit
Congress to pass a law like RFRA.
Second, it is clear, after the Court's decisions in Smith and Flores,
that the states remain free to enact laws like RFRA, particularly if they
do so under the authority of their state constitutions.3" In this regard, a
uniform law, along the lines of RFRA, might be developed and
submitted to all state legislatures for adoption. While mustering
support in all the states appears to be a daunting task, it is common for
uniform laws to be adopted in other contexts.3 The fact that RFRA
was supported by a broad array of groups that cover the political
spectrum and was overwhelmingly adopted by the House and the
Senate 32 certainly indicates that there is significant support for such auniform law in all the states.33 A Uniform Law of Religious Liberty, for
30. It is a matter of accepted constitutional law that states may, under the auspices of
their own state constitutions, increase protection for human rights, including religious liberty.
In the words of Professors Nowak and Rotunda:
State courts are the final interpreters of state law even though their actions are
reviewable under the federal constitution, treaties, or laws. The supreme court of a
state is truly the highest court in terms of this body of law ... This power is an
extremely important one, for it means that state courts are always free to grant
individuals more rights than those guaranteed by the Constitution, provided it does
so on the basis of state law. The federal Constitution establishes minimum
guarantees of rights. Granting additional liberties does not violate its provisions.
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16 (5th ed. 1995).
31. The Uniform Law Commission and the American Law Institute regularly engage in
the development and recommendation of uniform legislation. They generally work in
private as to public law areas, but they might be willing to assume this responsibility. If they
are not willing to assume this responsibility, others might do so. For example, the very
coalition that developed RFRA in the first instance might submit it to the states, in its
current form or with some minor revisions in light of objections raised to it.
32. Professor Laycock and Oliver Thomas summarized the vote regarding RFRA: "On
October 27, 1993, the U.S. Senate passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA) by a vote of 97-3. The House of Representatives, after passing a similar bill by
unanimous voice vote on May 11, 1993, passed the Senate version of the bill on November 3,
and President Clinton signed it into law on November 16." Douglas Laycock & Oliver S.
Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEx. L. REv. 209, 210
(1994).
33. It might be wise to limit the nature of the rights of prisoners under such a uniform
act, in order to limit opposition from the Attorneys General of various states. Of course, this
could be done in some states and not in others, depending on the reaction of Attorneys
General in some states. This would also have the effect of limiting the specter of a "heavy
litigation burden on the States" bemoaned in Justice Kennedy's opinion. City of Boerne v.
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2171 (1997). Of course, it might also be possible for the states to
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adoption in the states, would no doubt be constitutional and would
secure the very liberties sought to be protected under RFRA. 4
These two and other possible legislative responses to the Court's
opinion in Mores make it clear that RFRA, in some form, should not be
declared to be dead. Even if the Supreme Court, at first blush, seems to
have intended to deny Congress a place at the table in the dialogue
about the availability of religious exemptions to laws of "general"
application, Professor Sullivan and other scholars in the religious
studies area may yet offer assistance on two fronts: (1) They can help
revitalize RFRA at the federal and state levels by offering support for
the proposition that laws of general applicability can often have some
inherent religious bias, as a matter of process and substance; and (2)
Once RFRA in some form is revitalized, at the State or Federal level,
they can help in the ongoing interpretive dialogue that will necessarily
ensue.
Justice Kennedy's unsupported claim that permitting parties to seek
exemption from laws of general applicability on religious grounds
would place a "heavy burden on the States" might also be verified or
rejected by state experience under a state RFRA. Justice Kennedy
seems to be arguing that the no exemption doctrine under Smith would
make for more clarity in the law and would, therefore, limit the number
of cases filed. This is a claim that needs empirical verification. It is
conceivable that, over time, doctrine under a state RFRA provision
would become sufficiently clear that there would be a reduction in the
number of cases litigated, because exemptions would be more readily
given and parties would not be required to prove intent to discriminate
against religion or some hybrid claim, as is currently required under
Smith. This empirical question-whether the Smith doctrine or a RFRA
law would stimulate more litigation activity-may also be tested at the
federal level, given that the President has indicated that the
Administration is taking the position that RFRA continues to apply as
against the federal government." It can be hoped, in this regard, that
the President will be aggressive in ensuring that religious claims are
contradict Justice Kennedy's empirical conclusion that heavy litigation burdens would
necessarily attend RFRA or a law like it. Justice Kennedy offers no empirical support for his
assertion, and it may simply be overstated.
34. It must be acknowledged, however, that state courts might raise separation of
powers questions similar to those raised by the Supreme Court in the Flores decision. See ihL
35. William Marshall, attorney in the White House Legal Counsel's Office, indicated
that President Clinton is taking the position that RFRA continues to apply to the federal
government in a talk given at a conference at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock on
Friday, September 19, 1997.
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protected at the federal level and that such protection will, in fact, limit
the incidence of litigation.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGION THAT WARRANT PROTECTION
As previously noted, it has proven difficult (if not impossible or
improbable) to develop a viable definition of "religion" or
"conscience." In an analogous context, Professor Hyland notes the
difficulty of defining "sport," but proceeds to "depict its distinctive
characteristics-what qualities are especially striking or strong in these
activities."36 Similarly, more can be gained in terms of the definitional
dialogue suggested by Professor Sullivan if we focus on setting forth the
distinctive characteristics of religion, as opposed to endeavoring to
provide a definition that will cover all religions. Additionally, setting
forth those distinctive characteristics of religion, in an open-ended
sense, suggests a series of reasons why society benefits from providing
broad protection for religious exercise. I would have welcomed some
comments by Professor Sullivan in this regard, but she did not make
such an offering. I will, therefore, suggest for the purpose of opening a
dialogue on this significant topic that there are a number of
characteristics37 of religion that elucidate what should count as
"religion" and also justify for recognizing a vibrant version of religious
liberty.
At the outset, I acknowledge that not every religious act partakes of
all of these characteristics, but an examination of these characteristics
does seem to offer support for protecting religious liberty. An
examination of such characteristics can also be of assistance to jurists
and lawmakers as they engage in the dialogue regarding what acts
should be protected under the rubric of the First Amendment's religion
provision or related provisions. For the purposes of this commentary
on Professor Sullivan's paper, the discussion regarding each
characteristic will be brief. I will focus on religion, but much of what is
said may characterize acts of conscience, as well.
36. DREW A. HYLAND, PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT 128 (1990).
37. I do not purport to be arguing that this list of characteristics is necessarily
exhaustive. There may certainly be other characteristics that can be offered. Nevertheless, I
offer this short list as illustrative. I discuss these characteristics and the benefits of "religion"
in much greater detail elsewhere. See Rodney K. Smith, The Role of Religion in Progressive
Constitutionalism, 4 WIDENER SYMPOSIUM J. (forthcoming 1998).
[Vol. 81:487
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A. Religious Exercise as a Responsibility-based Right
Religious liberty is responsibility-based, which differentiates it from
many other rights, which seem to be based on individual preference or
license. Religious acts are often a matter of obligation. Many religions
are based on a notion of covenant-the believer binds herself to Deity
and agrees to follow certain commandments or precepts. Following
such commands or precepts is not always easy or convenient. Indeed, it
is sometimes difficult and often requires personal sacrifice. In a world
that appears to be increasingly hedonistic and bent on shifting
responsibility to others,38 there is something refreshing and meritorious
in protecting a right that is responsibility-based. The taking of
responsibility, which is necessary to the functioning of any society, is a
value that deserves protection under law.
B. Religious Exercise as Other-directed
In a related sense, religious exercise is often other-directed. It is
directed to Deity or caring for others, in accordance with the
commandments or precepts of one's religion. Most Christians and
other religionists, for example, take seriously their obligation to serve
others.39 As dramatically illustrated by Mother Teresa's life of service,
such religiously motivated service helps those in immediate need and
offers a sense of hope to those who are touched by the goodness or
spirit of her great work.' In a world often plagued with selfishness, this
characteristic of other-directedness offers evidence that religious
exercise may merit special protection. Other-directedness may also
provide a basis for more of the sort of cohesion that is necessary for a
society to persist than does self-centeredness. Even if this were not the
38. Sadly, one need look no further than modern tort law to see how parties often shift
responsibility to others or otherwise fail to accept responsibility for their acts. See, e.g.,
Timothy D. Lytton, Responsibility for Human Suffering: Awareness, Participation, and the
Frontiers of Tort Law, 78 CoRNELL L. REv. 470 (1993).
39. What at first appear to be obligations may in fact prove to be great blessings In my
religion, I am "commanded" to visit and offer aid to those in need on a regular basis. Over
the years, I have been greatly blessed by following the command. I have made many friends
and have felt the joy that necessarily attends assisting another. How true it is that often the
greatest beneficiary in each act of service to another is one's self.
40. Mother Teresa might be criticized in some circles for her acts of charity, see, e.g.,
Robert A. Sirico, Mother Teresa's Critics Attack Private Acts of Charity, THE LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., Oct. 6, 1997, at lB, but her service and other-directedness is generally conceded to
be of benefit. Certainly, not every religious act is other-directed; and, even when the act is
other-directed, it might not be productive of good in the same sense that Mother Teresa's
other-directed actions are. The concept of service to others, however, seems to be a value
generally worthy of protection or promotion.
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case, the promotion of means of serving others would seem to be a
social good that merits protection.
C. Religious Exercise and Community
Other-directedness often gives rise to another characteristic of
religion: A capacity for community creation. Religionists often join
with other believers, and occasionally non-believers, to form close knit
and often self-sustaining communities. Of course, as is the case with
many of the characteristics of religion, this community-building aspect
may have its darkside.1 Many religionists form communities that are
insular and sometimes even antagonistic to other groups. This
insularity or antagonism often presents problems in our pluralistic
world. Nevertheless, this community-building characteristic is
meritorious in at least two senses: (1) It helps individuals cope with the
alienation that often attends solitary life in our complex and often
impersonal contemporary world; and (2) It reinforces the need for
individuals to join together to achieve common ends in a more effective
manner and to gain meaning from relating to others. This commitment
to community may, therefore, be in some measure transferable to
society generally and may be a social good in that sense, as well as being
a social good in terms of helping individuals deal with the implications
of the complex and often impersonal world in which we live.
D. Religion and Reverence
Another related characteristic of much religion is a sense of
attendant reverence-for example, reverence for Deity and reverence
for creation. Reverential awe and the respect that it engenders is a
value that may be on the decline generally in contemporary society. A
sense of reverence adds meaning to one's life and seems to have some
capacity to deal with the alienation that often attends life. It may also
lend itself to a certain respect or reverence for others that may be
critical in any community, political or otherwise. While skepticism may
be generally be healthy, when it prevails, and negativism becomes
pervasive, it can be destabilizing in its effects."2 Reverence may be an
effective counter-balance to the pervasive negativism that often
characterizes contemporary society.
41. See infra at Part III.G., for a discussion of the "darkside" of religion.
42. Negativism and general irreverence in radio and other media programming may, for
example, contribute to declining commitment on the part of the citizenry to the political
system itself.
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E. Religion as a Special Epistemology
One of the significant and sometimes unique characteristics of
religion is epistemological in nature. Religious knowledge is often
extra-rational in some respects. In discussing religious decision making,
Obert C. Tanner captures this epistemological difference when he
notes: "Here is a fact, yet one which defies intellectual analysis. It is a
strange thing that an experience so decisive as to influence a person's
total life and commitment should yet be described as ineffable,
unutterable, indescribable, and unexpressible. '43
Elder Dallin Oaks, a former President of Brigham Young University
and a dean at the University of Chicago's Law School, also describes a
certain interaction between reason, the tool of much of secular decision-
making, and revelation, which is a significant form of gaining knowledge
in the religious context:
[R]eason screens revelation and revelation confirms or overrules
reason. As concerns sacred knowledge, it is just as important for
reason to have the first word as it is for revelation to have the
last word. I believe this is one meaning of the Lord's command
for his people to "seek learning, by study and also by faith."
4
In a related sense, I have previously noted that:
Even matters of conscience that are secular in nature often seem
to be the combined product of a dynamic between religious faith
or personal inspiration and reason. Reason and personal
inspiration are tools that assist in the pursuit of truth and the
peace and purposefulness that attend conscience.
Postmodernists, with their emphasis on context and their distrust
of reason standing alone, provide a helpful insight-conscience
and the pursuit of meaning might not solely be the product of
reason. The person of conscience might ultimately have to act
on faith and reason, although faith, as such, may not be
religiously based .... Transcendent or ultimate truths (truths
central to one's self definition [and, perhaps, worldview]), are
discovered through a dynamic that includes an interplay among
reason, faith, and context.4'
The epistemology that often attends religious choices and
commitments of conscience provides a means of making decisions that
is beyond the scope of reason alone, as we know it.
43. OBERT C. TANNER, ONE MAN'S SEARCH 151 (1989).
44. DALLIN H. OAKS, THE LoRD's WAY 66-67 (1991) (quoting THE DOCrRINE AND
COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 88:118).
45. Smith, supra note 2 at 671, n.94.
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I once had a colleague who was committed to animal rights as a
matter of conscience.4 My colleague has used the tools of reason to
deal with the issue of how we should treat animals. Reason has aided
her in her search for answers to actual issues that arise almost daily in
that context, but reason alone is not dispositive, as evidenced by the fact
that other "reasonable" people have not reached the same conclusions.
My colleague, therefore, after amassing all the evidence that can be
marshaled through reason, is left to decide the issue on some more
introspective basis. She labors over the evidence until she comes to a
sense of peace regarding it. At that point, she is able to resolve the
issue in her own mind and heart. While not necessarily labeled as a
religious epistemology, I suspect that many decisions related to difficult
issues not susceptible to clear-cut resolution through reason are made
by employing just such an epistemology. An epistemology of this sort
may not be exclusively religious in nature, but it surely describes the
religious decision making process in many respects. In a sense, reliance
on religious texts that were themselves derived from a revelatory
experience or some other form of communication with G-d is but a
product of an epistemology quite different from the epistemology that
purportedly characterizes most secular decision making.'7
This different epistemology warrants protection for at least three
reasons: (1) In the case of difficult questions, questions that have not
been susceptible to clear resolution through the exclusive medium of
reason but that must be resolved in at least a provisional sense, the
epistemology of religion and conscience may provide us with the
necessary provisional closure that ultimately permits society to move
46. I intentionally have used an example of "conscience" rather than "religion" to
demonstrate this point. I have done so to illustrate that acts of conscience may be similar, in
this and other respects, to religious acts. Of course, I could have easily used a religious act to
demonstrate the point. For example, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s decision to remain active in
the Montgomery Boycott was religiously motivated, in an epistemological sense. See Rodney
K. Smith, Conscience, Coercion and the Establishment of Religion: The Beginning of an End
to the Wandering of a Wayward Judiciary?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 954-56 (1993).
47. It must be conceded, however, that there are similarities between the epistemology
that characterizes the secular and that which typifies the sacred. Professor John Witte, Jr.,
for example, has argued that:
Law and religion are methodologically related. Both have developed analogous
hermeneutical methods, modes of interpreting their authoritative texts. Both have
developed logical methods, modes of deducing precepts from principles, of
reasoning from analogy and precedent.
John Witte, Jr., Law, Religion, and Human Rights, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 6
(1996). The origin of the text in the religious context is quite different, however, as an
epistemological manner, from the epistemology that gave birth to secular laws and texts.
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forward; (2) Use of this "religious" epistemology may provide us with
more than a tenable answer to difficult questions-it may provide us
with a sense of personal peace or edification that enables us to be truly
committed to our auswers;' and (3) This form of decision making may
in fact lead us to truth in ways that reason alone cannot and is,
therefore, deserving of protection."
F. Religious Exercise and Personhood
It is clear that religion is a very significant source of personal
meaning. One can laugh at the story of a purported survey done of a
major university's graduates, that revealed that 75% of them considered
themselves to be religious, whereas only 25% thought that religion was
important in their lives, precisely because it is hardly conceivable that a
truly religious person would consider her religion to be of little
importance. The very nature of religion is that it tends to describe that
which is essential to one's own definition of self. Religion and possibly
other related forms of conscience generally reflect that which is of
greatest moment in the human spirit of the believer. As such, religion
should be protected. Professor Robin West put this well recently when
she raised the following rhetorical question: "What becomes of a
theory of justice based upon consistency and plumb-line and
untempered by nurturance, when it slights the nurturing impulse to
bring members of the community to their highest potential and cultivate
the greatness in the human spirit?"5 Professor West is right in calling
for nurturing "greatness in the human spirit," which is often reflected
in religion and the commitment of conscience, for two reasons: (1) A
society that fails to respect this essential aspect of the personhood of its
citizenry fails in its claim to being a just society; and (2) This respect
may itself facilitate the pursuit of truth and justice (i.e., as the citizenry,
or a portion thereof, seek after the "greatness of the human spirit," they
48. See Smith, supra note 46, at 952-57, for a more detailed discussion of the concept of
edification.
49. Decision making through religious inspiration or conscience may in fact lead to
truth, when reason alone cannot. Indeed, even a skeptic would have to concede that it is
possible that the epistemology of religion may yield truth. Once that point is conceded, this
different epistemology should be protected. Of course, the darkside of answers received in
this manner-religious epistemology has resulted in good and bad-counsels some caution in
protecting the epistemology. In a sense, the establishment clause of our Constitution may be
read as limiting the excesses of the epistemology of religion, satisfying our need for caution
in protecting religious epistemology. See infra at Part III.G.; see also infra notes 43-46 & 47
and accompanying text.
50. Robin L. West, Justice and Care, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 31,40 (1996).
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may find it in some measure and be able to share it with others to the
betterment of all who will hear).
G. The Darkside of Religion
Just as there are benefits that are inherent in religion, there is a
darkside that often manifests itself. Any one with a sense of history
knows that much suffering has been and continues to be religiously
motivated. The same is painfully true, as the Twentieth Century attests,
of ideology. Hitler and Stalin, for example, brought considerable death
and suffering in the name of ideology.
Religion, however, is legally constrained under the establishment
provision of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution in
ways that ideology is not. Religion may, in a partisan way, win the
hearts of the people, but it cannot be directly enshrined in our
governmental affairs in the same way as ideology. Under the
establishment provision, government simply may not prefer one religion
over another, or religion generally over other matters of conscience,
although religious arguments may be translated into secular (more
ideological) arguments and raised in that form in the public square. 1
The establishment provision seems to have done its work well, in
this regard, in our nation and have constrained much of the darkside of
religion, particularly combined with a compelling state interest or
similar standard for free exercise purposes. Ideology and other forms
of political decision making have not been similarly constrained. Of
course, one need look no further than the loss of life and suffering
caused by some small religious groups in our country, to see that
suffering continues to be religiously motivated from time to time. That
suffering, however, has been privatized, largely perhaps through the
establishment provision, and has been of a lesser magnitude than that
occurring in our nation's history in the interest of an ideological or
political viewpoint. Indeed, on balance, if one were able to amass such
statistics, I am confident that the good done by religion (e.g., the
feeding of the hungry and the caring for the needy) would far outweigh
the harm done in the interest of religion, particularly given legal
constraints that are in place to limit the darkside of religion in the
United States.
51. Professor Michael Perry has written thoughtfully about this subject and has
concluded that religious arguments can only be relied upon in the making of public policy,
when they are translated into reasoned, secular arguments. MICHAEL JOHN PERRY,
RELIGION IN POLITICS (1997).
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In addition to the particular arguments previously raised supporting
protection for religious exercise, therefore, it should be acknowledged
that the darkside of religion-its capacity to wrest control of public
power and cause suffering-is legally limited in ways that ideology is
not. Religion, therefore, given its inherent worth and the fact that its
role in the wielding of public power is limited, surely is deserving of
substantial protection, including protection in the form of exemptions
from laws of general application. Ideology and political expression, on
the other hand, are not so limited; and, in terms of an equitable balance,
may not deserve exemption from laws of general application, in the
same way that religious exercise does.5 2
IV. WHEN IS RELIGION BURDENED: SOME COMMENTS ON
SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS
If RFRA is revitalized, at the state or federal level, as suggested in
Part II of this comment, courts and perhaps lawmakers will have to
wrestle with the issue of when religion is "substantially burdened," such
that it merits legal protection.," Professor Sullivan addresses this issue
in some depth in her paper.m In doing so, she refuses to opt for a single
test; rather, she concludes that religiously motivated as well as
religiously compelled behavior should be protected. Again, I am in full
agreement with Professor Sullivan.
It is generally conceded that religiously compelled behavior-
behavior that is clearly required if a believer is to be obedient to the
obligations mandated by an established religion-should be protected.5 5
It is less clear, however, that religiously compelled behavior-behavior
that is more subjective and individualized (not based on the
52. Professor William Marshall has argued that various forms of expression and religion
should be equated. William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise
as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1983). It is not surprising, therefore, that he concludes
that religious exemptions from laws of general applicability are not justified. William P.
Marshall, Defense of Smith & Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991). It is
clear, however, that Professor Marshall's conclusion is not equitable. It does not equate
religion with ideology and expression; rather, it disfavors religion. Under Marshall's view,
religion may not, on establishment grounds, wrest control of the government, but ideology
may. It seems imminently fair, therefore, given the privatization of religion, that religious
exercise be given exemptions from laws of general applicability.
53. Other interpretive issues will have to be address (e.g., when are government
interests sufficiently compelling to justify limiting the free exercise of religion), as well.
54. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 445-46.
55. This is the more restrictive test and is easier to apply, enabling courts to avoid
assessments of individual sincerity, although they must be convinced that the individual is a
member of a religion that requires the act involved in the case.
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requirements of an established religion) in nature56 -should be
protected, because concerns have been expressed regarding the
incapacity of courts to deal with personal religious sincerity, in a
subjective sense.7
Jurists out of fear that they might do harm to some individuals by
failing to recognize what are in fact sincere beliefs, may be guilty of
committing an even greater harm-the harm of failing to permit a party
to be given an opportunity to argue for the sincerity of her belief.
Indeed, even if the party is not able to persuade the court that her
religious act is sincerely motivated, she would surely prefer the
opportunity to try than to have no opportunity whatsoever to prove her
case. It must be conceded, however, that proving the sincerity of an
individualized belief is typically more difficult than proving that one is
adhering to the tenets of an established religion. Therefore, it will
admittedly be more difficult for individuals to prove subjective
motivation than to demonstrate compulsion.
There is another sense in which compulsion and motivation may
require some difference in treatment. Behavior that is compelled, in
the sense that failing to act would be to violate a covenant between the
individual and her Deity, may deserve greater solicitude than does
religious behavior that is motivated by one's religious beliefs but is not
compelled by those beliefs. The line is not always clear, but an
illustration should help clarify the point. A Catholic may believe that
she is required to attend Mass and may prefer, perhaps even on
religious grounds that do not rise to the level of obligation, to attend
Mass at a particular time. The attendance at Mass is compelled, but the
preference of times is not. Courts should provide greater solicitude
when an act is compelled or required than when it is merely preferred.
In this regard, I would suggest that the compelling state interest test,
which requires that a Court find that the government have a compelling
interest that is being applied in the least restrictive manner before it can
regulate the religious activity, must be used in cases of religiously
compelled exercise. If problems, of manageability or substance,
56. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 452-53.
57. It is somewhat ironic, however, that courts are reluctant to assess sincerity in this
context, when they engage in similar assessments on almost a daily basis in other contexts.
Fraud, the determination of punitive damages, criminal intent, and a host of similar issues of
a subjective nature are regularly decided by courts. Certainly, the task is daunting, but its
difficulty does not demand that the court refrain from acting. In this sense, the failure of
courts to examine sincerity in the religious context, which results in the outright dismissal of
the religious claim, places religion in a disfavored position.
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developed in implementing the compelling interest test in cases of
religiously motivated, as opposed to compelled, actions, Congress could
revisit the statute and amend it to provide for a balancing test in the
case of religiously motivated actions. That test would not require that
the government prove a compelling state interest. It would suffice if the
government's interest outweighed the religiously motivated act. This,
again, highlights the virtue of a statute, as opposed to an amendment,
for the purposes of constitutional dialogue.
I agree with Professor Sullivan that subjective religious acts should
be protected, requiring assessment of sincerity. However, attention
must also be given, as Professor Sullivan also suggests, to developing a
fair process. Additionally, that process should be overseen by judges
who are empathetic and willing to take seriously claims of religionists,
whose claims may seem foreign and perhaps even pernicious. These
judges might be administrative or judicial in nature. Indeed, given that
the President has indicated that the federal government considers itself
bound to adhere to the mandates of RFRA, it may be necessary for
administrative personnel to deal with such claims. They do must be
sensitive to those who appear before them, asserting a religious claim,
and efforts should be made to ensure that this sensitivity becomes a part
of the decision making process."
When I was engaged in the practice of law, I regularly appeared
before a judge who was a long time family friend. I often felt that he
was bending over backward to understand and even empathize with the
other side's claims when I appeared before him. I know that he was
trying to be fair, and wanted to be personally assured that he was not
unfairly favoring my position. Given the power with which we are
bound by our own cultural, intellectual and religious paradigms
(paradigms as strong as the friendship that bound me to the judge), it is
imperative that judges and others involved in assessing religious claims
be very sensitive to their own potential prejudices and, as a
consequence, endeavor to empathize or at least fully understand in a
respectful manner religious claims that differ from their own religious,
cultural or intellectual beliefs.
V. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CULTURAL PRESERVATION
Professor Sullivan raises but refuses to take a position on the issue
58. Sensitivity of this sort could be developed through a combination of administrative
statements regarding the role of those hearing such claims and through actual training.
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of cultural preservation versus religious liberty.9 She raises the issue in
the context of the desire of some Indians in Chiapas to maintain their
culture, in the face of religious proselytizing. ° A similar issue has
recently been raised in Russia, where the Parliament passed a law to
restrict religious liberty in Russia on the ground that Russian religious
culture was being undermined by the proselytizing efforts and the
presence of certain minority religions.6 This effort was largely initiated
by the Russian Orthodox Church, which many Russians equate in some
measure with Russian culture. 2 Many Muslim nations make similar
cultural arguments in restricting religious liberty. 3
A general caveat is also in order. A recent study argues that the
cultural diversity argument [generally and not just as to religious
culture] often plays into the hands of the state and is used to rationalize
the arbitrary exercise of power that cannot be justified by claims of
philosophic or cultural distinctiveness. It is critical in any human rights
discourse that a clarification and differentiation be made between
legitimate cultural specificity that is deeply imbedded in diverse belief
systems and values, and the state's exploitation of this contention.'
Although she does not so argue, it may be that Professor Sullivan is
unwilling to take a position on this issue on the ground that it is so
contextual in nature that it must be decided on an individual, case by
case, basis. I am somewhat sympathetic to this viewpoint. Indeed, on
similar grounds, I have argued that the requirements of the
establishment provision or value should not be enforced in Indian
country. Indian religion is often so inextricable from Indian culture in
many respects that it would cause significant harm to the culture to
require a separation of the Indian religion from the public sector in
Indian country. I caution, however, that individual Indians should be
59. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 458-59.
60. Id
61. See, e.g., Daniel Williams, Faith-Curbing Bill Becomes Law in Russia, WASH. POST,
Sept. 27, 1997, at A16.
62. While attending a conference on religious liberty in Central and Eastern Europe, I
heard a Russian Orthodox Priest make a version of this argument. He argued that Russia
and its culture was in captivity during the communist reign and the Church needed time to
reacquaint itself with its people and restore their religious identity and culture.
63. See, e.g., Donna E. Arzt, Religious Human Rights in Muslim States in the Middle
East and North Africa, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD TODAY: A REPORT
ON THE 1994 ATLANTA CONFERENCE WITH BOOK EXCERPTS 139-162.
64. Adamantia Pollis, Cultural Relativism Revisited.- Through a State Prism, 18 HUM.
RTS. Q. 316,320 (1996).
65. Rodney K. Smith, Sovereignty and the Sacred: The Establishment Clause in Indian
Country, 56 MONT. L. REV. 295 (1995).
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permitted free exercise of religion on the reservation. That free
exercise would, in turn, permit proselytizing among Indians, as a means
of facilitating their individual religious choices. Under this balance,
where legitimate cultural concerns are evident, the Indian religion and
culture is permitted to remain pervasive, but is not permitted to be
exclusive. A similar solution may be in order in Chiapas, but I would
hesitate to provide the majority religion with exclusive rights, rights
which would entirely trump individual religious liberty.
In the case of Russia and other nations that seek to impose a single
religion on their people on cultural preservationist grounds, I can
reluctantly accept some form of established religion, but I certainly
would oppose the imposition of an exclusive religion. Of course, even if
only an established and not an exclusive religion is mandated, the kinds
of risks discussed previously regarding the darkside of established
religions should be anticipated.'
In the American system, with the possible exception of Indian
country, I believe that we would do well to maintain our current
unwillingness to trump religious liberty on cultural grounds. This
position is justified for a number of reasons. First, culture itself is
extremely powerful. As a member of a minority religion, I know how
difficult it can be to maintain one's religious commitment in the face of
a culture that is both pervasive and powerful. It takes courage as well
as commitment to act on religious grounds counter to one's dominant,
national culture. I believe that the dominant culture needs no more of a
trump card than the one it naturally has. If a trump card is given, it
surely should not be any greater than permitting an established but not
exclusive religion. Even this should occur only in instances when it can
in fact be demonstrated that the religion is inextricable with the culture,
that the culture would be harmed, and that the harm to the culture
outweighs the value of individual religious liberty.
VI. CONCLUSION
Professor Sullivan's paper contributes much to the dialogue
regarding religious liberty. Although many of her insights are under-
developed, as are my own in my commentary on her paper, she has
made a case for lawmakers and judges drawing more heavily on the
expertise of scholars in religious studies. Even though, based on the
Smith and Mores decisions, a majority of the current Supreme Court
66. See infra Part lII-G.
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appear disinclined to protect religious liberty, except when it is
intentionally and directly being discriminated against, there is some
reason for cautious optimism that voices like those raised by Professor
Sullivan will yet be taken seriously. Congress and certainly the States
can do much to put the dialogue about religious liberty back on track.
In this paper, I have tried to supplement Professor Sullivan's
arguments in a manner that further demonstrates that religious liberty
is really worthy of protection and should be a topic of serious discussion
at every level and within every branch of our government. I remain
confident that, despite its arrogance in asserting a childlike claim that it
must have the last word on major free exercise issues, the Supreme
Court will not be permitted to end the very conversation about religious
liberty that Professor Sullivan and I join in supporting.
